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Schelling’s philosophy of religion was the work of a lifetime of 
philosophical activity, considerably larger in ambition and accomplishment 
than the loose assemblage of questions usually collected under that name: 
the existence of deity, responsibility for evil, and immortality.  
 
Schelling is the most difficult of the ‘German Idealists’ to fit into 
a consistent historical narrative and the least amenable of that 
generation of thinkers to philosophical reconstruction or contemporary 
retrieval. Part of this is due to entanglements early in his career with 
philosophical alliances and polemics, part with what the public 
perceived as shifts in his philosophical focus, and part with a refusal to 
stay on the high road of Kant’s narrative about modernity’s conflicting 
claims of rationalism and empiricism, which could only be reconciled in 
a critical recognition of the secure but hybrid nature of empirical 
knowledge―its content derived from sensation, its form secured by 
empty concepts furnished by reason. Schelling appreciated well 
enough Kant’s conceptual precision; he chaffed, though, at Kant’s 
legislation of the limits of philosophy’s competence: a metaphysics of 
experience, a formalistic morality, strictures placed on the artist’s and 
scientist’s imagination, and the reduction of religion to morality 
without remainder—which meant, in Germany, accommodation with 
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the political status quo. In his willingness to return to pre-critical 
sources of inspiration such as Plato, Spinoza and Leibniz, his 
incorporation of religious theme voiced by heterodox figures such 
Giordano Bruno, Joachim di Fiore, and Jacob Böhme, and his 
seemingly quixotic fight against Newtonian optics and the methods of 
hypothesis-formation and experimental test practiced by the working 
scientists of his day, Schelling seemed in his own day to court ridicule. 
However one tries to fit him into the narratives of other movements 
and figures—the rise of German Idealism, the end of idealism, the 
origin of existentialism, the end of metaphysics, Christian systematic 
theology, the beginnings of psychoanalysis—he presents features that 
resist incorporation and make him an outlier.i  
 
Schelling and Hegel both started lecturing on the history of 
philosophy early in the nineteenth century when they had fairly similar 
positions, and in their mature years they used these lectures to 
critique each other’s positions. Hegel’s students Michelet, Erdmann, 
and in their wake Richard Kroner, perfected a polemic style of 
historiography that minimized Schelling’s role in the formulation of 
‘absolute’ or ‘objective idealism’. Hegel’s jibe that Schelling conducted 
his philosophical education in public had quite a bit of play. At the turn 
of the twentieth century even a sympathetic critic who called Schelling 
the “prince of the romantics” found no less than six phases in the 
development of his philosophy and in a less than kindly turn of phrase 
dubbed him ‘Protean.’ii  
 
In the first decade or so of his philosophical writings Schelling 
published a prodigious amount at a very fast clip, not troubling himself 
to carefully note changes in position, and often engaging in behind the 
scenes machinations with past and present colleagues such as Fichte 
and Hegel. The times were turbulent: first Reinhold, then Fichte 
secured some recognition as systematizers of Kant’s critical 
philosophy, but when Reinhold turned from idealistic epistemology to 
objective logic and Kant repudiated the Wissenschaftslehre, there was 
no obvious successor to Kant. The conversations and literary 
exchanges between Lessing, his literary heir Mendelsohn and Jacobi 
about Spinoza’s naturalism or ‘pantheism’ and theistic alternatives to it 
made the intellectual situation in Germany about as fractious as the 
streets of Paris had been a decade earlier. Nothing of Schelling’s early 
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publications secured him notice as an independent voice until his 
audacious attempts to graft a philosophical account of nature onto the 
stalk of Fichte’s moral systematization of Kant’s philosophy. Indeed his 
invention of Naturphilosophie was the first of three ‘audacities’, if I 
might use the term-- philosophical turns or revisions of outlook that 
were novel or ‘unforeseeable’ in some sense and resumptive or 
surprisingly continuous in another. Schelling forces the critic to dance 
a step more lively than the simple two-step of a pre-critical Kant and a 
critical Kant, or a logical Wittgenstein and an ordinary language 
Wittgenstein. Changes in his system occur in a seismic or geological 
way—Schelling will later argue that the decision whereby one adopts 
one’s character is preconscious, repressed, and beyond recollection. 
Less charitably, it has of course been argued that Schelling was 
insufficiently self-conscious of the drift of his thought.  
 
I do not have the luxury of arguing for it at length here, but let 
me suggest that an analogy with musical composition might throw 
some light on Schelling’s philosophizing. There are continuous or 
recurring themes, voiced predominantly or subtly, transposed to 
different registers and elaborated at length (argument) or with sudden 
flashes of insight, and executed in progressions of extended 
dissonance or sudden resolution. This image may capture both some 
of the complexity of Schelling’s work and the uncanny way nothing 
ever drops out or is left aside. But given that since Aristotle, 
philosophy has largely hued to the path of propositional truth and 
eschewed the tropes of Socratic irony or Platonic mythologizing, if one 
took this suggestion seriously Schelling would stand condemned by his 
own words, for his own account of artistic creativity puts the artist in 
the service of her work, condemned evermore to do more than she 
can say.iii Making Schelling the philosopher of the unconscious, or the 
forefather of psychoanalysis, invites the same difficulty.  
 
Be that as it may, there are three movements to Schelling’s 
thought, or three audacities: (1) Naturphilosophie, or the turn to a 
metaphysics of nature to show that, pace Jacobi’s reading of Spinoza, 
nothing has ever left the absolute—or that the finite does not exist 
from its own side. Once this absolute or objective idealism is 
sufficiently articulated, the second audacity is: (2) to leave this 
ontologically founded idealism behind as a surpassed moment in the 
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risk of a freedom so radical that it is free from all being, and especially 
necessary being. The third audacity is the synthesis of this uncanny 
mash-up of freedom and necessity in the grandest of all narratives 
European civilization produced: (3) the history or life-careers of God 
and humankind, as modelled in the mythologies of various ancient 
civilizations and Christian revelation. Each successive phase brings the 
prior forward, but fundamentally modifies it. Schelling’s philosophy of 
religion is his whole philosophy, put before the public sequentially over 
a period of nearly half a century. I think Schelling articulated it for 
himself in a bare fifteen years, however, from the 1800 System of 
Transcendental Idealism and essays of the Zeitschrift für speculative 
Physik (1800-1801) to the 1804 Philosophy and Religion, the 1809 
Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, to 
the cryptic 1815 lecture to the Bavarian Academy, The Deities of 
Samothrace.iv  
 
Why Is There Something and Not Nothing?  
 
As a gifted student and young writer, Schelling displayed an 
ambition to surpass the received wisdom of the day about what were 
appropriate and inappropriate subjects of philosophy. Student 
notebooks on Plato’s physics and metaphysics of nature thematize the 
transient nature of the elements, and, rather than focusing on 
Timaeus’ pictorial account of imitation of the ideas, concentrate on the 
plastic nature of the receptacle or primary matter, invoking Philebus’ 
category the ἄπειρον.v Schelling will later argue that Naturphilosophie, 
which can be included within an embracing philosophical idealism 
because it refuses independent existence to the entities of nature and 
demonstrates that nature’s operations reintegrate difference back into 
primordial identity, has but one problem: the construction of matter.vi 
A series of early essays that imitate the structure of the first version of 
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre share Fichte’s vision of completing or 
systematizing Kant’s critical philosophy, but not his vision of what Kant 
called “the primacy of the practical.” The young philosopher instead 
seems to hope for a logical-metaphysical completion of the Kantian 
project based on Kant’s incomplete deduction of the categories, his 
discussion of God as the summum or Inbegriff of all concepts, and his 
remarks on the necessarily systematic form of philosophy.vii Symbolic 
of differences that will emerge between the two thinkers, where Fichte 
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writes das Ich in 1794, Schelling writes “the absolute appearing in 
us.”viii Remarks on the insufficiency of the ontological argument, on the 
nature of modal categories and the origin time are scattered 
throughout the early writings, but these themes will not converge until 
1802-1804 when Schelling makes it clear that in intellectual intuition, 
being cannot be conceived in any way other than as self-existent or 
necessarily existent. Coming to clarity on this will be the apogee of 
Schelling’s early Spinozism. As we shall see, however, since Schelling 
adopts this concept in the train of Leibniz’s peculiar phrasing of the 
ontological question: why is there something and not nothing?, and 
Kant’s classification of modal predicates as conceptual, hence lacking 
ontological freight, necessary being is an inherent dialectical or self-
undercutting concept, applicable only to something that contingently 
exists. This, of course, will not become clear to Schelling until he 
moves away from the absolutism of the Naturphilosophie (or 
philosophy of identity) and comes up with a novel definition of God’s 
contingent existence as a state of being consequent upon utter 
freedom or original decision.  
 
In the midst of disputes with Fichte about the nature and 
direction of transcendental idealism after Kant, Schelling veered 
sharply toward Spinozism and its naturalistic perspective, and away 
from the psychology of the moral life which was the undergirding of 
Fichte’s 1794 Wissenschaftslehre. Though the dialectical 
argumentation of that work would remain fundamental to Schelling’s 
elaboration of the Potencies or (conceptual) levels of being in the 
unfolding of his philosophies of nature, freedom, and religion, 
Schelling’s 1801 Presentation of My System of Philosophy leveled the 
charge of subjectivism against Fichte’s idealism and proclaimed itself a 
“philosophy of identity.”ix Some thirty years later, after he had twice 
made fundamental alterations in his philosophy in order to recast it as 
a dynamic and double-sided (conceptual and existential) account of 
the life of God and humankind, Schelling reconsiders the label and 
deems all of his work prior to the 1809 meditations on radical freedom 
Naturphilosophie. After Hegel’s death and perhaps anxious to 
distinguish his own early position from what Hegel had called 
‘objective idealism’ and Schelling now called mere negative or 
conceptual philosophy, Schelling returns to 1800 System of 
Transcendental Idealism which views nature as self-objectification of a 
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transcendental subject. In effect, in the Munich lectures on History of 
Modern Philosophy, Schelling covers his tracks and minimizes the 
extent of his experimentation in his journey from Fichtean disciple to 
philosopher of nature to Spinozist metaphysician.x Thinking he had 
placed himself beyond it, Schelling himself invents the From Kant to 
Hegel narrative that will eventually assign to him a role no larger than 
an entr’acte—a stagehand of Spirit.  
 
There are three features of the Naturphilosophy 1800-1804 that 
deserve extensive comment. The first is the uninterrupted and 
continuous nature of the metaphysical ‘deduction’ (or construction) of 
being and its potencies and the consideration of the operations of 
nature which minimize the at-first-glance independence of the items of 
appearance and reveal that their true being is interdependent or 
organic. The second is the way that reason’s consideration of the being 
of the absolute is framed either as immanent (or nondual) version of 
the classical ontological argument for divine existence or is framed in 
highly dialectical spin that Leibniz gave to ontology: why is there 
something and not nothing? The third is way the metaphysical 
question of individuation—or egress from the absolute—is made 
coextensive with an account of the origin of time, and both are given a 
voluntaristic account. Individuals have run away from home: the telos 
of unfolding phenomena is to invite the prodigals to return. Looking at 
these three themes, one might want to say that from early on 
Schelling’s primary domain of endeavor is philosophy of religion. As 
late as 1804, however, in discussions with his Fichtean friend 
Eschenmeyer, Schelling will admit of no sense to the term ‘God’ that 
transcends the absolute that reason can adumbrate, Spinoza’s deus 
sive natura.xi Schelling is not yet ready to imitate the theistic turn that 
Fichte took after 1800.  
 
[1] From first to last, Schelling insists that the philosopher of 
nature re-enacts the original being of nature, which is active or 
expressive, self-affecting, and therefore self-structuring in ways that 
higher levels or ‘exponents’ of organization reflect and resume lower 
levels. Matter or the filling of three-dimensional space is the nadir of 
nature’s self-expression, and appears to mere perception as passive or 
inert, subject only to mechanic—externally imposed—motion. But what 
at first appears to be external and separated turns out to be internally 
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related, active, and pointed toward dimensions of interiority such as 
sensation, perception and intuition. The organism, the self-regulating 
entity that is the home and support for intelligence in humans, is 
nothing different from matter, but is a knot of activity and 
purposiveness supervenient upon this lowest and all subsequent levels 
of inorganic elaboration—phenomena the physical sciences call gravity, 
conduction, cohesion, electromagnetism and reactivity to light. In a 
suitably subdued and thoroughly predictable manner, nature is a work 
of necessitated activity.  
 
The systematic aspect of Naturphilosophie comes from two 
sources, the philosopher’s reconstruction of the complex web of 
interconnection and reactions that nature does all at once in a 
successive or narrative fashion and the repetition of basic logical 
strategies that nature itself enacts from its own side in constructing 
complex strategies. To elaborate the first conjunct, there is 
emergence, development, metamorphosis—Schelling even uses the 
Anglophone term ‘Evolution’—in nature, but this is the philosopher’s 
free contribution or condescension to the very human need to 
understand by way of story; Schelling is pre-Darwinian and too 
Aristotelian to befriend randomness. Regarding the second, nature 
itself seems to have hit upon a set of basic organization strategies that 
it repeats, whether one looks at higher-level structures like inorganic, 
organic and intelligent life, mid-level structures (called dynamic 
processes) such as magnetism, electricity, and transmission of light, or 
the three dimensions of space. All of these are amenable to 
mathematical treatment; the logical distinctions of identity, difference, 
and totality (relative identity) can be mapped on a single continuous 
line and treated as negative and positive numbers. Schelling calls 
these repetitive structures potencies [Potenzen]—the term suggests 
power or capacity, and, derivatively, exponent or mathematical 
power.xii He also makes it into a verb [Potenzierung] which suggests 
an ability to manifest on a higher level or to jump levels. It is part of 
Schelling’s ‘deep Spinzoism’, never questioned or rejected, that, 
nothing standing in the way, being entails a capacity to realize itself or 
more fully express itself: to be is strive [conatus]. Once the concept of 
potencies is framed, it never leaves Schelling’s vocabulary.  
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Despite Schelling’s systematic intent, elaborated in the Fichte-
Schelling Correspondence, of framing a three-part system with a 
Spinozistic theory of identity and difference replacing the genetic 
scheme of activity, production and intuition modeled in the 1800 
System of Transcendental Idealism, Schelling was unable in years 
following his break with Fichte to produce a philosophy of spirit or 
consciousness equal in detail to his Naturphilosophie—with the 
exception of some lectures on the Philosophy of Art in 1802 that 
prefigure his interest in mythology and religion but were highly 
dependent on Winkelmann’s classicism. Versions of Schelling’s system 
published in 1801 and disseminated in lectures in 1804 keep Spinoza 
in the foreground. Thanks to the increasingly general idea of the 
potencies, Schelling is able to move from metaphysics—the account of 
the embracing character of the absolute and the pseudo-independence 
of finite particulars ―to the general and then the increasingly more 
specific features of nature. Schelling had taken a naturalistic turn in 
his disputes with Fichte and though he showed great ingenuity in 
turning to Platonic theory of ideas in trying to solve the problem of 
individuation, or the apparent self-separation of the individual from the 
absolute, he has much greater success in arguing that nature is a 
physical proof of idealism in the way that its operations and processes 
themselves undo separation.  
 
[2] Though Naturphilosophie takes its proximate inspiration 
from Spinoza and takes the Platonic Timaeus as its template and so 
unsurprisingly depends on the notion of the absolute’s necessary 
existence, there is an element of insecurity or nonbeing included in the 
concept from the first. It is this element of dialectical vulnerability that 
makes necessary existence contingent and eliminable in later phases 
of Schelling’s thought, where the divine itself gambles away the “sure 
thing” of its necessary being to risk a career of freedom and a life as 
spirit. We will come to this knot of difficult and original ideas in due 
time; for now I wish to show that early in his career as an absolute 
idealist or one of the co-inventors of negative philosophy, there was 
something wobbly in what was claimed was the absolute’s intrinsic 
nature: that its very idea guaranteed its reality.  
 
In the first announcement of the so-called system of identity, 
Schelling claims that once it has turned aside from subjectivism, from 
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the I and its perspectival representations, philosophy can function in 
the pure ether of reason. It reconceives the items of experience in a 
fundamentally mathematical or geometrical form; its philosophical task 
from that point on is to rationally construct (we would say 
‘reconstruct’) on metaphysical and naturalistic lines the particulars and 
genera of our experience until we achieve the degree of closure and 
validity that a hypothetical or nonfoundationalist account permits. To 
this constructed absolute and the intuition of the philosopher who does 
the constructing is ascribed not factual being, but logical-mathematical 
necessity. Yet there is a suspicion that this whole logical edifice is a 
fable, what Kant would cheerfully call a Hirngespinst. Schelling 
announces, “Reason’s thought is foreign to everyone; to conceive it as 
absolute, and thus to come to the standpoint I require, one must 
abstract from the one that does the thinking.”xiii But can we humans 
abstract from ourselves? Ought we try to?  
 
Three years later, in the System der gesamten Philosophie, 
Schelling rethinks the identity theory which grounds Naturphilosophie 
in a more rigorous way, working again from Spinoza, but not a literal 
reading of the Ethics, where Spinoza had largely been content to 
elucidate the unity and necessary existence of substance through 
preliminary definitions and axioms. Instead Schelling fashions an 
ontology of power in which primal being is seen not just to be self-
constituting but self-expressive; the concept of expressivity explains 
what Spinoza could not explain, how attributes and modes follow from 
substance’s self-sufficient being. When it comes to expressing how the 
absolute or god/nature exists, Schelling invokes the ultimate question 
that “vertiginous intellect” can pose: why is there something rather 
than nothing?, and finds that in luminous, lightning-like clarity reason 
is pulled back from the abyss and realizes the impossibility of 
nonbeing.xiv I have elsewhere called this Schelling’s Hitchcockean 
moment, his ontological cliffhanger—not just because there is a 
moment of high drama in this isolated text, but because, once 
articulated, the suspicion that nothing was not in fact impossible turns 
into the worm coiled in the fruit of Schelling’s whole previous 
philosophy and which turns the ruby promise of necessary existence 
into the mundane brown rot of contingency. Schelling will return to 
Kant and admit that modal predicates are just predicates, while 
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existence is something else: God or the absolute exists necessarily, if 
it exists.xv  
 
[3] The third feature that Schelling carries forward from the 
identity-theory phase of Naturphilosophie to the later philosophies of 
freedom and religion is the notion that the finite particular’s self-
positing—its decree, as it were, that it is the point of origin from which 
all perspectives are to be calculated—is its positing of time. While 
existing in the absolute or in the idea it is essentially the same as the 
universal, and so related to every other particular, but when it 
separates itself from the absolute or ‘falls’ into finite existence, its 
relationships to others are parsed out as successors to some and 
predecessor to others, or as past and future. The individuality of the 
particular entity in its ersatz declaration of independence constitutes 
its ‘finite identity,’ its point of view, its subjectivity, or to say the same 
in Kantian terms, its temporality. xvi  
 
While the doctrine of the ‘fall’ of finite beings is a somewhat 
quizzical feature of Naturphilosophie, where it provides another 
opening for the critique of Fichtean subjective Idealism, the idea of 
free decision and the ability of a free being to abandon modes of being 
formerly necessary (or at least ‘in character’) gives Schelling the 
occasion for defining what radical freedom might be: not ‘arbitrary 
choice’--which at best would signal only confusion about one’s 
character and environment-- but putting what has been compulsory or 
purely necessary behind oneself as ‘past’ and moving on into the 
novel. The time of freedom comes from futurity; the accounting of 
necessity embraces the past, and if we find the later Schelling 
believable, stops there. Falling into addiction is a story of conditioning 
and the economy of neurotransmitters; entering recovery is quite 
different. As we shall see, the life of God is an experiment in 
recovery—from addiction to necessary being and from isolation within 
it.  
 
Decision: Separating the Divine Yes and No  
 
We have just had to make a move from abstract ontology to 
lived human psychology in order to understand a move that Schelling 
makes. While his stock of erudition in classical philosophy, the history 
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of Christian theology, and the cultures of antiquity replete with their 
myths and artistic accomplishment grows weightier as he ages, 
Schelling’s approach to philosophy and religion becomes more simple 
or classical, and less burdened with the methodological and 
epistemological self-consciousness of modernity. Increasingly the 
mature Schelling adopts the standpoint of medieval Christian and 
renaissance philosophies that place humankind in the center of things 
and work by analogy between the microcosm and the macrocosm. As 
the first text of the radically new philosophy of freedom announces, 
“Only man is in God and is capable of freedom through this being-in-
God. He alone is a being of the centrum [ein Centralwesen] and for 
that reason he should also remain in the centrum. All things are 
created in it just as God only accepts nature and ties it to himself 
through man.”xvii This antiquarian guise will hardly endear Schelling to 
the empiricist, or one who waits for science to endorse her philosophy. 
It frankly returns to reader to a prescientific framework where myth, 
narrative, and religious traditions traced the horizons of human 
consciousness. And if we are not entirely comfortable with this when 
we read the arguments of the German Idealists with a hope for a 
retrieval that meets our current needs, we should remember there was 
quite an obstinate antiquarian streak, extending even to a love of 
things medieval and Catholic, which seized the souls of their literary 
and artistic friends.  
 
Although it is conventional to distinguish Schelling’s middle 
philosophy or philosophy of freedom from his late philosophy or 
philosophies of mythology and revelation, there is considerable overlap 
between the two. As one might gather from the title of the work that 
inaugurated the middle philosophy, the 1809 Philosophical 
Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Matters 
Connected to It, Schelling’s interest is philosophical and his method is 
argumentative; a great deal of the work is devoted to showing that the 
systematic intent of the earlier Naturphilosohie can only be carried out 
by substituting a version of the principle of sufficient reason for the 
concept of the sameness or identity of the different that had previously 
been advanced as the system principle. Schelling concedes that his 
earlier philosophy had hoped in vain to find a logic connecting the 
orders of nature and that of spirit (self-conscious agents). Now a 
dynamic principle is invoked instead, freedom, the logic of which 
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demands that novelty can occur or that existence float free of 
conditioning ground. On the basis of this new way of thinking first 
things, Schelling is able to fashion a narrative in which a living God is 
able to leave primordial or necessary existence, risk life in creative 
freedom, let nature and humankind go forth as separate, in order to 
become spirit and reunite with created spiritual being. A smaller 
problematic, the possibility and origin of evil, and where to place 
responsibility for evil, is embedded in the larger scheme—the classical 
project of theodicy. The late philosophy, begun in 1820 but not widely 
disseminated until twenty years later, takes over this narrative of the 
divine and human life careers, but attempts to trace it out in great 
detail in the mythological narratives and religious views of prior 
historical civilizations, calling itself positive philosophy or philosophy of 
revelation. Though Schelling claimed he was in no sense dependent on 
Christian dogmatics and it was not his intent to do systematic 
theology, he comes close to a complete elaboration of the so-called 
‘truths’ of Christian revelation, but in a historical or ‘empirical’ mode.  
 
Another thing to note as we embark on the philosophies of 
freedom and revelation is that though Schelling continues to criticize 
the subjectivism of a narrow idealism, when he rejects Fichte’s 
idealism he is rejecting the primacy of the I and its incessant 
monologue about perceptions and arbitrary choices. He has learned 
from the Pietists, the poets, and from the detail argumentation of the 
first Wissenschaftslehre that there are many prompters, deciders,  
valuators and judges packed into our skins and that Fichte’s 
watchword: my being is my own deed, was true in many senses that 
consciousness most often will not or cannot acknowledge. As Goethe’s 
Faust rewrites the gospel, “In the beginning was the deed,” putting 
‘word’ and the obvious mental process under erasure.xviii The 
generation of critics who want to view Schelling as the forefather of 
psychoanalysis finds ample support in the writing of Schelling’s middle 
phase: the Philosophical Investigations of Human Freedom, the 
Stuttgart Lectures, and the drafts of Ages of the World. Schelling does 
not think, however, that the divine is a projection of the human 
imagination, as Feuerbach, Freud and perhaps William Blake thought, 
but that the two mirror each other in identical intertwined careers.  
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In this section, we will look closely to two central issues: 
Schelling’s definition of freedom and the nature of the two principles of 
being that allow for it. I shall not stress his treatment of the issue of 
evil and the question of divine responsibility for it, for in the middle 
period Schelling seems prone to relapse into pantheism just when he 
declares himself free of its snares. The account offered in the 
philosophy of religion is more successful and more difficult to argue: 
creation entails that God excretes the nondivine element within itself, 
and this rejected element becomes the cosmic Christ wherein 
humankind is created, falls, and is redeemed in Christ’s acceptance 
into deity. The simple account of Schelling’s theology is that the 
Menschwerdung Gottes implies the Gotteswerdung Menschen and vice 
versa and that in a process of clarification or refinement [Verklärung] 
evil and the “irreducible remainder” of nature will somehow be 
sublimated.xix  
 
[1] Before we can appreciate Schelling’s novel 1809 definition of 
freedom, both human and divine, we must carefully look at a defense 
of Spinozistic necessity or ‘decidedness’ that Schelling offered in 1804 
in the context of a discussion of the demands of a religious morality.  
Neither so-called arbitrary choice nor empirical lawfulness, the 
standards advanced by Kant, will suffice, says Schelling, but only an 
unconditional trust in the necessity that rules all. Spinoza, especially in 
his teaching on the ‘intellectual love of God’, recaptured the ancients’ 
sense of virtue: not arbitrary freedom but choiceless resolve 
[Entschiedenheit] for the right. The highest moral and cognitive 
standard that religion can advance is conscientiousness 
[Gewissenhaftigkeit], not the subjective standard of devotion or feeling 
offered by contemporary theories.xx There is no absolute standard of 
right [Sittlichkeit] that is the achievement or possession of the isolated 
individual; one is sittlich or virtuous only insofar as one is bound to do 
what is right without any consideration of its opposite. –This is as 
impassioned a piece of argument as one can find in all of Schelling’s 
writings. He is not seeking easy solutions or conceptual loopholes; this 
is a soldierly morality that he espouses, one that commands fidelity to 
the situation the agent finds herself in. And it is absolutely consistent 
with Spinoza’s teaching of universal necessity—which, when 
understood and trusted, is amor intellectualis dei. Schelling takes aim 
at Enlightenment fables of human perfectibility, infinite moral (or 
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revolutionary!) progress, and the futurity of blessedness, and longs 
instead for the recurrence of a golden past, morality as spokes 
radiating from a single wheel, not the spectacle of humanity wandering 
in a circle. This is the morality of necessary being, the divine decree.xxi  
 
[2] What can be said to alter this rigid view? What alternatives 
can there be, when the necessity of the necessarily existent has 
defined the position of every point and the conditions of every ‘agent’, 
when inner determinations of virtue and power correspond only to 
outer determinations of destiny and fate? First of all, there is no need 
to soften the view: what is viewed from the outside as necessary is 
seen on the interior as decision or free act of will. Kant had articulated 
this basic view when he argued that the free act is outside of all causal 
connection, or outside of time. Empirically, the only evidence for a free 
act is the occurrence of new series of phenomena, but the decision or 
free act itself is outside of time—and even the agent has no privileged 
access to it. What the addict really wanted or did when she nominally 
started on a ‘recovery’ will surprise her as much as those around her 
when the consequences of her new course of action unfold. –Fichte 
had said: the I is its own deed, consciousness is self-positing. The I is 
really nothing other than self-positing, remarks Schelling, but it is not 
coextensive with consciousness. All self-apprehension or cognition 
presupposes something deeper, being which is fundamental willing, 
which makes itself into something and is the ground of all modes of 
being.  
 
But this account of the individual’s deed, if it settles the smaller 
question of the individual’s freedom, character, and responsibility for 
the good or evil that in a sense it is, raises larger questions that 
Schelling struggles to answer in light of his prior commitment to an 
identity of different principles in the absolute and his new stance of 
looking at the development of spirit in terms of will, or of a conflict of 
wills. In moving from the pantheism of Naturphilosophie to creationism 
of the Investigations, ontological commitments have shifted: in the 
former there was one agent (natura naturans) and one self-conscious 
being (finite spirit, the last level of the deployment of organization in 
natura naturata). Now there are two agents in one complex structure 
of being, both capable of spiritual activity and destined to be reunited 
in love. It is striking that definition of love Schelling offers here: that 
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two beings capable of being independent of each other nonetheless try 
to be together, is a reprise of a description first offered in 1804 as a 
depiction of attraction between sexually dimorphic animals. The logic 
of love and of lust is identical.xxii  
 
[3] One striking feature of the Investigations is the effort 
Schelling makes to show that the systematic intent of Naturphilosophie 
can be fulfilled only if its core logic of the essential sameness (or 
indifference) of phenomenally distinct orders can be translated into a 
dynamic framework suitable for agents as well as entities. The 
distinction between ground and existent, employed occasionally in the 
1801 philosophy of nature to characterize latent and emergent stages 
of the same phenomena or potency is now used to demarcate basically 
different modes of being, roughly nature and spirit, or put in 
voluntaristic terms, the will to evil and the will to good. Actually the 
orders of being (the contractive will of the ground and the expansive 
will of love) are prior to and ontologically necessary for the moral 
order. The factors that are distinguished but indissolubly united in God 
are contingently united, and so dissoluble, in the human being; the 
possibility for good or evil, grounded in God’s nature, becomes in 
humans the reality of good and evil. –That there are human individuals 
with good and bad wills, or who have chosen egoistic or altruistic 
characters, according the Schelling’s earlier nonvolulntaristic 
meditations, depends on their character and their ‘resolve’ or fidelity 
to their different situations. The conclusion that God is therefore the 
ground of possibility of good and evil, but is absolved of responsibility 
for their actuality, seems unsatisfying. Oppenheimer had a pretty 
definite intuition of what he had done when he saw the first atomic 
explosion and uttered “We have become like gods.” What he had done 
did not correspond to his original intention to solve a problem in 
physics. –Schelling’s attempt to translate original principles of being 
into modes of willing seems less than successful too. When he declares 
with utter generality and sweeping rhetoric, “Will is primal being 
[Ursein] to which alone all predicates of being apply: groundlessness, 
eternality, independence from time, self-affirmation. All of philosophy 
strives only to find this highest expression,” his translators remark that 
he has overstepped himself and promised more than he can deliver.xxiii 
Heidegger too was critical of Schelling at this point, seeing in the turn 
to a philosophy of will a slip back into the metaphysics of presence.  
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[4] Whatever its argumentative shortcomings, the Philosophical 
Investigations show a total shift in Schelling philosophy, from a static 
ontology of nature to a dynamic philosophy of religion. While the basic 
story is that of the emergence of moral beings, with will and 
responsibility, from the natural principle, this can in no way happen 
within that principle. Freedom must be withdrawn from nature, as it 
were, like Prometheus’ theft of fire, and God and humanity be 
sundered as agonal combatants before they can be reunited in a 
spiritual bond over the course of history. Before this explanatory 
structure can be fleshed out—the basic narrative of the philosophy of 
revelation-- a more satisfactory account for the independence of 
nature and humanity from God must be discovered. This is work of the 
multiple drafts of Ages of the World, where Schelling offers a sketch of 
how the potencies evolve, contest, and fall into succession is a dream-
like exercise of imagination before the creation. The potencies are now 
viewed not as external classification but as ontological structures in 
their own right, self-impelled if not totally autonomous agent 
functioning not as explicit will or decision, but as dream-like 
apparitions of yearning and inchoate desire which deploy themselves 
in ghostly forms that fall back into their sensory and appetitive 
elements. Schelling distinguishes between a violent and 
unpremeditated scission (or ‘decision’) among the potencies that now 
and then (eternally) erupts and gives one temporary hegemony, and 
the creative, presumably conscious, decision of creation wherein God 
posits what is nature in it--that which is necessity or the play of mere 
imagination and desire--and enters into an ordered realization of the 
proto-possibilities.xxiv Schelling again comments that the deed or act of 
will that is the agent of decision― and in fact ecstatically ejects the 
existent from the basis of being― is preconscious and repressed.xxv 
What is past is locked away as eternally past, and what is there for 
consciousness is eternally cut off from its nature basis, “the irreducible 
remainder.”  
 
The entry into the philosophy of religion proper, that is, the 
yoked negative and positive philosophies comes with a double 
intensification of these themes: (a) the play of nonbeing or necessity 
in God’s natural basis prior to the decisive separation is rethought as 
leap over being, the assumption of a freedom so radical that it is 
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freedom to be or not to be, that is, a complete rejection of the ‘prior’ 
state of necessary existence, and (b) the scission between will and 
consciousness is deepened in the realization that the truth and reality 
of this whole narrative is beyond conscious grasp or conceptual 
explication. All philosophy that is merely negative—that is, , rational, 
conceptual, and driven by logic and argumentation― can only lead up 
to the bare idea of an entity with this sort of freedom, at which point it 
can and must reach out in experiment or exploration to an actuality 
beyond necessity and all concepts of existence.  
 
To Be or Not to Be?  
 
We suggested earlier that there is something like a process of 
musical composition in the makeup of Schelling’s entire philosophy, 
with themes voiced briefly and subtly early on swelling into 
prominence later on, and conceptual elements at first seemingly 
discordant eventually brought into harmonic resolution. If there is any 
merit to the metaphor, it implies that Schelling must be judged by his 
whole oeuvre as well as by the cogency of its elements or phases. The 
philosophy of religion and, more particularly, the late philosophy of 
mythology and revelation, must be taken as Schelling’s single 
accomplishment. For both the necessitarian ontology of the early 
Naturphilosophie and the volitional ontology of Human Freedom and 
Ages of the World are brought forward and intertwined in surprising 
way in Schelling’s final position. As we shall see, there are two 
overwhelming obstacles to appropriating this philosophy, first, the 
problem of scale or detail and, secondly, the problem of essentialism.  
 
In his 1841/42 Berlin lecture on the Philosophy of Revelation, 
Schelling first presented the philosophical outline of the positive 
philosophy, then its historical and theological content which he 
regarded not as mere application but as its enrichment or fulfilment. In 
our eyes I fear it cannot but count as an obstacle that Schelling’s 
narrative encompasses almost the whole of Christian doctrine as well 
the mythologies of various ancient cultures. Our way of doing 
philosophy is to isolate and reconstruct historical positions, preferably 
in sparse form, and to test the merits of their premises. Admittedly all 
the German Idealists cause grief in this regard, but the cumulative 
nature of Schelling’s argument causes special difficulty.  
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[1] The positive philosophy begins with the critique of the 
absolute idealism of Schelling’s own Naturphilosophie and Hegel’s 
system of philosophy, which moved solely in concepts in abstraction 
from things or sensory intuitions, and so attained a mere conceptual 
legitimacy. These philosophies were systems, indeed, but detached 
from any foundational reality. They could count as no more than 
negative philosophy, an analytic propaedeutic to a treatment of reality 
that was never furnished except in outline, at the end, and as the 
result of the analytic process. Schelling essentially attained this 
position in 1809 and attempted to put the Spinozism of the 
Naturphilosophie behind him, seeing that his earlier philosophy has 
begun and ended in the concept of the absolute as a necessary or self-
existing being. When the godhead sets out to become life, spirit, and 
God, the earlier philosophy must be abandoned, but it cannot be 
abandoned by any move less drastic that having the divine will, 
emergent from nature, bury its eternal past and become a life. But 
how can one undo necessary existence?  
 
I have argued that there is thinness to this idea of necessary 
existence from its first introduction in the identity-theory of the 
Naturphilosophie. If the ontological question, properly voiced, is the 
“vertiginous question”--Why is there something and not nothing?― 
then from the very start being has been conceived dialectically as 
infected with nonbeing, if not actually, then at least possibly. The odor 
of fishiness that explorers of the ontological argument have always 
smelled, though some chose to cover it with frankincense, was cleared 
discerned by Descartes: God was a necessarily existent entity, if it 
existed. From the side of the thinker and her thinking, necessary 
existence is eliminable. As Kant saw, existence is not a concept, but a 
contingent fact dependent on the state of the world.  
 
The novelty of Schelling’s philosophy of religion is that God 
clues into this situation ahead of the philosopher and remedies the lack 
by exercise of will. This point is where the narrative of the 1809 
Investigations becomes unclear and the drafts of the Ages of the World 
fail to illuminate except by arguing on a quasi-psychoanalytic model 
that deed or will must precede the arising of consciousness and must 
be structurally buried underneath consciousness in such a way that 
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retrieval is impossible. We shall investigate some of the ways Schelling 
tries to argue this transition in the next section, but will first have to 
deal with the difficult fact that Schelling in attempting to think outside 
the conceptual has left the a priori for the realm of the a posteriori. 
Schelling calls his new venture ‘philosophical empiricism’, 
acknowledging that it can be but an open system and can have 
authority only for those actively seeking along its lines. This is a form 
of thinking whose object is not given prior to thought, but actively 
produced by it. Its object stands beyond thought rather than being a 
product of thought. Only in way can Jacobi’s demand for some reality 
beyond human feeling and imagination be met.xxvi  
 
[2] Since positive philosophy is an experimental rather than an 
analytical enterprise, a voyage of discovery and not a cartographical 
expedition, Schelling’s texts in this period are full of neologisms and 
overlapping conceptual distinctions, none of which can be said to 
exactly designate their objects. Earlier attempts to talk of deity as the 
self-distinguishing process of  
 
Essence [Wesen]   and   Existence 
Being [Seyn]   and   the Existent [Seyendes] 
 
are superseded in the 1841/42 lectures by  
 
Unvordenkliche ,blind,   and   ontological capacity [Seinkönnen], 
or necessary being           will, or godhead [Gottheit].xxvii,xxviii 
 
Furthermore, all versions of these contrasts are pervaded by the late 
Platonic contrast between nonbeing and being [μἡ ὄν and ὄν], the 
dark and light principles which from the earliest days had occupied 
Schelling’s imagination and which could function in either natural or 
moral environments, becoming contraction and expansion in the 
former, and self-will (evil) or universal will in the latter.  
 
Crucial to the positive philosophy is the situation that the 
subject, not the observing philosopher, makes these distinctions, 
which means that by the power of necessary and inconceivable being, 
contingency emerges from necessity and, uniting necessity and 
contingency in itself, becomes God—Lord over being. As in the middle 
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philosophy, Schelling thinks this occurs through willing, primordially a 
withdrawal from necessity or the assumption of freedom over both 
being and not-being. The necessarily existent wills itself as Sein-und-
Nichtsein-Können, or contingently existing.xxix This breaks primordial 
being, hitherto the undisturbed tranquility of groundlessness and 
beginninglessness, into opposing factors: being and freedom, nature 
and spirit, B and A.  
 
In making necessity or his own primordial being other than 
itself, God makes it an independent power of being and turns its 
natural necessity (which is a kind of relative nonbeing) into real 
possibility, capacity for being. In so doing, the contingently necessary 
or living God first becomes objective in its necessary counterpart, and 
only here is the possibility for consciousness situated. God finds itself 
in unprethinkable being before it thinks, and it must wrench itself from 
this blind or mute being before it can become a thinkers or knower. 
Here, Schelling announces, is his point of divergence with Jacobi who 
would posit the being and consciousness of God simultaneously. 
“Instead we must proceed from an original being of God that precedes 
him.”xxx There would be no point to consciousness if its sort of 
knowledge were not the cognitive side of contingent being, the registry 
of what happens, not of what is eternally the same.  
 
How is this separation from primordial being possible or 
conceivable? Schelling no longer seems to prize the simple category of 
will; it is contingency, ability to be or not to be, that asserts itself over 
blind or monotonous being and first reveals the law of being, to which 
even God is subject: nothing is to remain hidden, unclear, latent—
everything is to be brought to decision. Schelling calls this is the “idea” 
in the inchoate divine imagination, the intuition that it is fundamentally 
other than the capacity for being which is connected to its eternal or 
necessary being.xxxi 
 
This idea is the idea of freedom; to see it is will; to act on it is to 
depart from the security of being. Reality itself is inherently dialectical, 
says Schelling, in such a way that the possible has more value than 
the actual, the contingent than the necessary, and the novel and risky 
than the ever-present. Reality is evidently popping with possibility!  
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[3] The other-than-divine becomes the locus of creation: 
humankind, and in the human, the natural world. The potencies, or 
capacities for being which evolved out of the primordial blind being, 
become independent powers, as it were, and in succession shape the 
epochs of human historical existence― which are also the phases of 
God’s self-revelation. Thus the abstract and ontological side of positive 
philosophy turns toward history, the unfolding of human cultures, the 
mythologies that are the flowering of deity in so-called pagan cultures, 
and the mystery-cults of ancient Greek that lead one to the truths of 
Christianity: creation, fall, redemption through a humanly suffering 
God, and immortality (of sorts). This all makes for a vast narrative. We 
will have to confine ourselves to three topics: creation and the human 
status of Christ, Christ’s divinization and the generation of the Trinity, 
and the future of human spiritual evolution. Schelling had vast 
amounts of learning at his disposal in classical languages and 
literatures, the history of religions, and Christian scriptures and 
theology, so his narratives are engaging. What I find interesting is the 
economy of his account: the three potencies in their dialectical 
unfolding structure human history, the phases of religious 
consciousness in ancient peoples; they also determine the internal 
relationship of the deity, the so-called different ‘persons’ of the 
Godhead. Also interesting is Schelling’s argument that if revelation is 
universal, It cannot be confined to one people or one cultural epoch.  
 
[a] Creation and the Christ: The Naturphilosophie pictured 
humankind’s (structural) evolution inside nature, while the philosophy 
of freedom did the reverse, showing nature to be a process within the 
cosmic creature, humanity. The positive philosophy situates both 
within what Johanine theology called the preexistent Logos, the 
medium of creation. While orthodox Christian thinking identifies the 
Logos with the second person of the Trinity and the earthly Christ, 
Schelling identifies it with the excluded blind or pre-personal ground of 
the living deity, within which humanity both takes its origin and falls 
from union with the divine.xxxii It is the historical adventure of various 
human cultures to mark out stages on the return to God—the basic 
pattern marked by Ouranos, Chronos and Dionysus in Greek culture, 
and their female counterparts Demeter, Persephone, and Cybele. 
These are shapes of God, phases in revelation.xxxiii  
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Within the Hebrew culture, Christ plays the same role as 
Dionysus and Cybele—mediation with the ancient, harsh gods and 
redemption through suffering. Christ is essentially human, the pure 
human, divinized by God in response to his obedient suffering, and 
thus incorporated into the godhead. That this is a purely Arian account 
does not bother Schelling, who insists he is doing philosophy, not 
dogmatic theology.xxxiv  
 
[b] With the acceptance of Christ into the godhead, the Spirit is 
generated as the bond between Father and Son, the principle of 
sharing, and outreach. Revelation marks out stages in human history, 
conceived as a single narrative with universal meaning, with the age of 
the Father covering ancient times and civilizations, the age of the Son 
coinciding with the domination of Rome and Europe, and the age of 
the Spirit yet to come, marked by the withering away of the difference 
between ecclesial and secular communities. Schelling borrows this 
historicized version of the life of the Trinity from the writings of 
Joachim di Fiori.xxxv As far as eschatology goes, Schelling continues to 
maintain that a form of immortality or life after dead is possible, with a 
sort of distillation or Verklärung of one’s moral personality; the 
ontological possibility of such a transformation rests on the resonance 
of the human Gemuth (soul) or the hidden unity of psyche and body 
with the divine Geist (spirit), as Schelling argued in the final pages 
1810 Stuttgart Lectures.xxxvi  
 
Conclusions  
 
We have indicated that the immensity of Schelling’s narrative 
poses obstacles to its acceptance; so does the fact that it is quite 
Eurocentric, despite Schelling’s attempt to argue for the validity of 
non-Christian religious as being necessary steps toward God’s full 
revelation in the Christian narrative. Weightier than the problem of 
scale, however, is that Schelling thinks that terms such as ‘God’ and 
‘man’, ‘being’ and ‘ontological capacity’ designate universal essences. 
Informed by evolutionary biology, neuroscience, genetics and 
emergent genomics, we have a difficult time imaging anything other 
than a statistical reality to entities that we think take shape discretely 
but which we continue to denominate in the old vocabulary of sortal 
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nouns. Reality seems to unfold in micro-events far below the threshold 
of our unaided perceptions. Though Schelling seems to have 
anticipated something like the process philosophy of Whitehead and 
Hartshorne, particularly in his valorization of contingency over 
necessity, his religious imagination seems anchored in classic Christian 
dogma and the Renaissance tradition of placing “man” in the center of 
a single process of divine revelation. Paul Tillich, the one theologian 
obviously influenced by Schelling, followed him closely only in matters 
of terminology and periodization of the epochs of revelation. But he 
accepts Schelling’s core thought only in an agnostic and relativistic 
sense. It is convenient to call godhead or the Father abgründig—one 
need say no more. And it is likewise convenient to define the Christ 
only in terms of his acceptance as Messiah by early communities, and 
completely prudent to talk of the Spirit’s presence in human 
communities as ambiguous. But this is quite a dilution of Schelling’s 
daring as Christian thinker. 
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